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IN THE SlJPREME COURT 
OF THE s~r A 1~E OF UTAH 
ST .. \ TE OlP lTT AT-I~ by and through 
it~ R(L~D t~O:\l~[lSSlO~~ 
Plain.tiff and Appell(wd;, 
- vs.-
J+ HO"\"\T .. ~RD \T AL~J~""TTNE and 
FJJORENCE R. \TAI$EXTINE, 
Defendants, 
\Yr~tST·ERN STATF~S R.EFINING 
l~ 0 \T P .. \~'""Y, a Corporation" 
I ntr..r-~ ~en·i·n .. g De_f endamt 
arui Respo·n.d CJlf. 
Case 
No. 9100 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTR.ODU(~TION 
There are four tr anser1 p1.s of tc8t.imony in this case, 
dating from .A. ugust 12, 1952, through Mareh 11, 1 fi;)~J.. 
For the purpoE-;es of this hrief, \Ve shall refer to tla~ tes-
timony adduced on tl1c~ motion for the order of occupaney 
as rrr+ 0. 0., and to other testimon·y as Tr. Trans.~ dated 
___________ TT ___ ., R-eference is made to tho rec.ord as R. 
l 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to a resolution of the Road Commission, 
dated July 21, 1952 (Exhibit No. 1 ), the plaintiff7 State 
of Utah, by and through its R-oad Commission, com~ 
meneed this antion on July 31, 1952, against the defend-
ants, J. Hovtard Valentine, nov.t deceased, and Florence 
S .. Valentine, by the service of summons, the :filing of a 
complaint and a notice of the hearing on the motion for 
the occupanc.y of the property described in the complaint. 
(R. 1-8} 
On August 12, 1952, a hearing was held before the 
Sec.ond District Court on the motion for immediate occu~ 
pancy, at which time an order was granted, subject to 
conditions4 ( R4 50) On August 29, 1952, a formal order 
,\~.as entered l1y the court, granting t.h c plain tiff the right 
t.o immediately oc-cupy the premises, eonditioned t.hat 
t.he defendants be permitted to retain possession of the 
premises until said premises were actually needed by 
the plaintiff .. (R. 9) On December 6, 1955, the \Vestern 
States Refining Company~ a corporation, :filed a motion 
to intervene as a defendant in the cause. The e.ourt 
granted the motion4 (lt 13) On November 7, 1956~ plain~ 
tiff moved for the dismissal of the claim of the inter\·enor. 
'The motion was denied. (Tr4 Trans. Xov. 7, 1956, 4-8) 
Pursuant to notice filed and served on the defendants 
v·alentine on or about the 1st. day of November, 1955, 
the plaintiff took possession of the premises as of about 
the 12th day of December, 1955. Hearings on the matter 
on its merits "\Vere held on ~ovember 7, 1956, February 4, 
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19il9, and ~1 arch 11~ 1959. At the conclusion of whiell, the 
trial court entered a judgment on findings of fact and 
eonclusions of law in favor of the intervening defendants 
in the sum of $17 ~500, together with interest. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 5th of February, 1959, judgment \Vas 
entered and satisfied in favor of the defendants \!alen-
tine. (R~ 30-32) Hence, the Valentines are no longer par~ 
ties to this action. The question now before this Court 
is "\V hether the intervenor, Western States Refining 
Company~ can recover damages by virtue of the pur~ 
ported lease ~Thieh \ve shall discuss more fully as we pro-
ceed in the argument of this case. The record indicates 
that a lease \vas executed on April 10, 1952, between the 
Valentines and the Western States Refining Company~ 
involving the property sought to be condemned by the 
State Road Commission. (Exhibit A) 
.A.t the commencement of this aetion, the intervenor 
was not a party defendant. It '\VHS agreed and stipulated 
between the parties that nothing was on record to indi~ 
cate any interest in the property other than that of the 
'Talentines at the time the summons 'vas served in this 
ac-tion.. crrL Trans. D.Iarch 11~ 1959, page 33) 
.. :\t the hearing on the motion for thG oi"dcr of or('u-
pancy, ~1r. Valentine was the vice-president of the Vl est~ 
ern States Refining Company, and Mr. Wagstaff was 
tl1e ptf\~.;ident of the corporation~ both being present in 
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eourt and both agreed to the order of the court, not only 
by silence and acquiescence, but by constructive and 
aet.i ve participation therein. (Tr. 0. 0. 20-21) During the 
hearing on the order for occupancy, ~ir. "\\T agstaff V~-Tas 
named as associate counsel. (Tr. 0. 0. 18) 
1-\.t the date of the service of summons and the serv-
ice of notice of the motion f.or occupancy, the service sta-
tion \Vas TlOt in operation. {Tr. 0. 0. 13-15) (Tr. Trans., 
X OVr 7, 1956, p,. 9-10) 
STATEMENT OF POINrrs 
POIN't I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I~ PERMITTING THE 
WESTERN STATES REFINING COMPANY'" TO INTER-
\IE~E IN THE CAUSE FOR THE REASON THAT SAID 
CORPORATION ¥lAS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIIviiNG 
DML\GES FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF THE 
PURPORTED LEASE WITH THE DEFENDANTS VAL-
ENTINE BY ACQUIESCING IN AND RECEIVING THE 
BENEFITS FROM THE ORDER OF OCCUPANCY. 
PoiNT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I~ DENYING PLA.IN .. 
TIFF~s MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION TO IN· 
TERVENE BY THE WESTERN STATES REFINING 
COMPANY. 
Poi~T III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS IN 
DET·ERMINING THAT THE INTERVENOR WAS EN-
TITLED TO AND HAD A RIGHT TO OPERATE A 
SERVICE STATION UNTIL AUGUST 9~ 1962, OR AT 
ALL, AND TO HAVE JUDGMENT ENTERED IN ITS 
FAVOR FOR DAMAGES .. 
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PoiNT IV. 
THE PURPORTED LEASE WAS EXECUTORY 
AND AS SUCH WAS NOT BINDING UPON THE PLAIN-
TIFF WHO HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH LEASE. 
PoiNT v ..... 
THERE ARE NO DAlviAGES RECOVERABLE BY 
THE INTERVENOR, FOR THE REASON THAT AT THE 
TIME OF ENTERING INTO THE ALLEGED LEASE 
UPON WHICH THEY SUE~ THE INTERVENOR KNEW 
THAT THE PROPERTY WAS ABOUT TO BE CON-
DEMNED AND THAT ANY INTEREST IT TOOK 
WAS A DEFEASIBLE INTEREST SUBJECT TO 
DEFEASANCE. 
PorN-r VI. 
AT THE DATE OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS,. 
THE INTERVENOR HAD NO OPERATIONAL EXPE-
RIENCE AND COULD NOT EVALUATE THE LEASE-
HOLD .. 
.. PoiNT VII. 
THERE \VAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BE-




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
WESTERN STATES REFINING COMPANY TO INTEn~ 
VENE IN THE CAUSE FOR THE REASON THAT SAID 
CORPORATION WAS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING 
D1\MAGES FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF THE 
PURPORTED LEASE WITH THE DEFENDANTS VAL-
E!\TINE BY ACQUIESCING IN AND RECEIVING THE 
BENEFITS FROM THE ORDER OF OCCUPANCY. 
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The Western States Refining Company was not a 
party to the action until on or about December 6~ 1955 .. 
Non etheles 8, the co rpo ration through its principal office rst 
was in oourt and actively engaged in the arrangement 
contained in the order of occupancy.. Query: Is the cor-
poration bound by the agreements and stipulation of its 
officers entered into at the date of the order of oc.cu~ 
pancy, August 12, 19527 
As we understand the intervenor's contention be-
fore the trial court was that inasmuch as it ( t.he corpo~ 
ration) was not a party to the action, it could not be bound 
by any action agreed upon by its vice~president and 
acquiesced in by its president. rro this~ we disagree. '':r e 
tbi11k that even though such acts were apparently not 
authorized by the corporation, the same were ratified by 
the acceptance of the benefits accruing therefrom and 
that under the agreement,. they had no cause of action 
after the need for the property by the plaintiff was 
indicated. 
''It is a 'veil established general rule that a cor-
poration ,v}litll, '\vith knowledge of its officers' or 
agent::t ~ unauthorized contract or act and of the 
nta trrial fa r.t s eon~ern.ing it, rccc i i"r..:; and rc I ai·J1S 
/h.(' bettP.fit.r; resulting therefrom ratifies the trans-
;l r.tlon if it is one ra pa ble of ra tifica tio11 by 
parole. t J (Emphasis added) 
13 j\m. J ur., CorporatioiH:~, DSJ~ 
7 A. 1-'~ It. 467 and 48·7. 
~ f r ~ v ...a I e uti n e, as 'vell as ~1 r. \ Y a gs t a ff, '': a s a -l:1 in g in 
a dual ca pa(· i iy at the time of the he a ring on t ht~ motion 
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for the order of ooou pancy. ~lr. Valentine was the vice-
president of the intervenor and as an individual had been 
the O\VIH!f of the propt~rty sought to be condemned sinre 
1947. (Tr~ 0~ 0. 10) 
From the testimony of ~ir. Valentine (Tr. 0~ 0. 12)~ 
\\-e find the following statements: 
''TV e have grown from a small plant, of 
course~ a~ refineries go 1..ve are still a vPr~- small 
plant." 
"On r only recourse is to build ou,r O\vn sta-
tion1-3. Jlr e 1• ave he en planning to build this station 
on this place for the last three or four years~ We 
have been saving our money to get proper financ-
ing and have \vaited until ·u:e could get our volume 
up too and no'v ~ue have found that tte absolutely 
have to have it in order to take care of thi8 in-
er~·a sed produetion o j' our plant. '' (Emphasis 
added) 
And at Tr. 0. 0. 13~ Ivlr4 Valentine further informs us: 
"'"' Q. You are not eon testing the State ~s right to 
take this property~ 
"A. X o. 1 told them they co nld have it if they 
\Vould gi \'(' ~~-u· a strip Homev~~hcre else if 1 
cou1d mov(~ tny equipmenL on it. p 
(Emphasis arlded) 
In ans"Ter to the eo u rt :t s question the defendant 
Valentine t-:.tated ~ 
"\"\' e ean get hack tl•c hig f-)hare of thi.~ money 
the next fev{ m(nlths on the gallonage 1ve sell there. 
T1tr- monev has been spent, tbey are pumping ga~ 
t llc·rP tod'~~T· n { Enlphas[~ added} . 
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~fhis substantial information indi eatcs t hH t _jl1·. '.! al-
eJJtine ~·Hs not only acting in his own capacity as the 
lessor, but \Vas acting for and on behalf of the intervenor. 
1111 e \"\-,..estern States Refining Company took possession 
of t.he property immediately after the order of occupancy 
and they continued in such capacity as lessee until De-
cember, 1955. During that time, the corporation reaped 
t l l e benefits of th-e cond·itioned o rrler of occupancy and, 
t.lH.~refore~ are estopped from making any elaim as to 
datnages for the unexpired term of the lease4 (Tr~ 0. 0. 
15-17, 20) The order was entered on this basis. 
(Tr. 0. 0. 20) 
It is generall)· understood that estoppel to question 
or object to a thing done or any position taken by another 
may arise by express consent thereto. This rule has 
been applied in numerous instances to preclude the con-
~cnting par~.y from asserting the invalidity or avoiding 
the consequences of acts which were beyond the legiti-
mate and rightful powers of the parties acting \vhen done 
pursuant thereto, or in re1irua~c on, sueh consent ·~ such 
ns the reduction of a verdict by a court which h~~ no 
fJO\ver to disturb such verdict. 19 Am~ J ur., Estoppel,. 
para+ 61. 
The doctrine of estoppel is frequently applied to 
transactions in \V hich it would be uncon sci ona ble to per-
mit a person t.o maintain a po~iti.on incoltsistent with 
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one in \\·hi(·}~ het or those by Vt7hose acts he is bound, has 
acquiese.ed. 19 Am. J ur., Estoppel, para. 62. 
''Estoppel is frequent Iy based upon tile 
aecep1 n ru~e and retention 11y one having kno .. vlcdge 
(}[' notice of the facts or benefits from a trans-
ac.ti<~n, contract, instl'umcnt, regulation or statute 
upon "\Vhich he might ha\·e rejected or contested." 
''Such e~ to ppe1 operates to prevent a party 
thus benefiting from questioning the validity and 
effectiveness of 1 l~c matter or transaction insofar 
a~ it imposes a liability or restriction upon him; or 
in other "rords, it precludes one vrho accepts the 
benefits from repudiating the accompanying or 
resulting obligations. ~ ~ 
19 Am. Jur., Estoppel, para. 64, p. 686-687 .. 
HGenerally speaking, a part~y \viii not be per-
mitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take 
a position in regard t.o a matter "\vhich is directly 
eontrary to> or inconsistent \\·ith one previou~ly 
as;:.;umed hy him, at least. \vhere l1c llad or \\ .. as 
r.hargeab1e \Yi t 1t full kTlO\vlr~dg-e of the fae1 ~ and 
another \\·ill l llj prejud i PO< 1 hy hi~ act ionR. ~ ~ 
19 Am. J ur., Estoppel, para. 50r 
d The law '\vill not stand by in silence and see 
one party mislead anotl1er to his injury, whether 
by ignorance, nr.gligence or desig-n. ~ ~ 
Tracey v. fjtandard .A cc t~. I n.s. Co., 119 Me~ 131, 109 
~·\. 490, 9 A. I_j, R-. 521. 
In H a-rnrn.o·nd.'l ·c. Fle'l~)ellen (1932), rrex. Civ . .i\..pp., 
48 S.\V~ 2d 813, the court stated: 
9 
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"If a person either hy VlOrds or conduct has 
intimated that he \viii otTer 110 opposition to an act 
to he done or induces a reasonable belief that he 
consents to tlu.~ act in vie'v to be done and another 
person is thf~n~l,y induced to do that from which he 
otherwise might have ahstainod~ such person 
¥1-'"0uld be estopped from questioning the act done 
or tho fair inference to be dra,vn from his 
conduct.~' 
PoiNT Il .. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION TO IN-
TERVENE BY THE WESTERN STATES REFINING 
COMPANY. 
('rr. 1,ran~., November 7, 1956~ p .. 4-8) 
"\V e incorporate the argument contained under Point 
I and hereby refer to it as our argument under Point II 
of this brief. 
PoiNT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS IN 
DETERMINING THAT THE INTERVENOR WAS EN .. 
TITLED TO AND HAD A RIGHT TO OPERATE A 
SERVICE STATION UNTIL AUGUST 9, 1962, OR AT 
ALL!' AND TO HAVE JUDGMENT ENTERED IN ITS 
FAVOR FOR DAMAGES .. 
·The intervenor is bound by th-e stipulations and 
agreement made at tl1e hearing on the order of occupancy 
nnd the court's order in respect thereto.. The service 
station v.ras not built on the land in question and "-a~ not 
iu operation at the time of the ~er\Tiee of gummonH. All 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
affect on market value or value of lea.sehold interest has 
arisen from the date of the summons and the use of the 
property since that time. Section 78~34~11, Utah Code 
A.nnotated 1953. 
The intervenor is not in a position as an innoc.cn t 
purchaser who had lost tl1e benefit of its bargain. All 
value of the lease arose after the order of O('r..lJ pancy and 
\Yas tl~e resn lt of that ordcr4 The intervenor }lad .net tu=tl 
notice of the proc.e edings in this cause ; and if they so 
desired, they cnuld have come in under Section 78-34-7, 
Utah Code A nnotatcd 1953, immediately after the 81Jm-
mons was served in the action against the V alentincs. 
THE PURPORTED LEASE WAS EXECUTORY 
AND AS SUCH WAS NOT BINDING UPON THE PLAIN-
TIFF WHO HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH LEASE. 
On April 10, 1953, the defendants and th(~ inter-
venor entered into a lease agreemGnt (F~xhihit A), "\vhich 
[.;Hid lease provided in part as follo,vs: 
"Said lease to co-rn.Jncucc Oil· /.he 10th da.y of Au-
gu8t, 1952, for a tcrtn of ten years .fron~ thence 
n.e~tt ensuing fiUd to expi.re o·n l"h c 9th dny of ... A .. u-
gust, 19G2 .. ~ * *, the .first i u .~t all·nH!.n t to h er~otnr· 
dnt on flu-~ 1oth of ~-1 ngust, 1.~J.52, (;r as 800·n therr-
aft{'-r as a se-rt."ice sf a tion is erected an.rl ar:reptPtl 
as h crei n a/ i cr pro rid r'd~'' 
{EmplHi~i~ addrrL) 
The lease further provides in f.luhstctnce that the serv-
ice station 'vns to be coT~structed aeeording to plans and 
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spl~t~-ifications provided by the "intervenor and attaehed 
as a part of the lease. It further provides that the lessee 
may as~ign tlle lease to a corporation to be fo1·med which 
shall be a \V holly O\vned subsidiary of the lessee, and that 
the Hs~ignment shall be made without recourse to the 
lessee. It. is interesting to note at this point that no plans 
and specifications 'vere provided and approved insofar 
as ~Jxhibit A is concerned, and w·e }Lave no knowledge of 
any such plans and specificationsr 
rrhc intervenor in July and August of 1952 had no 
vested right in the proporty. A right which is not vested 
but lies in action and which requires resort to a court of 
equity to invest plaintiff with the right claimed is'~ execu-
tory·~'' H ardu;ick. v~ Atnerican Ca.·n Co., 113 Tenn~ ti57, 
88 S. W. 797; lla.tch v. Standard Oil Co., 100 U. S. 124, 
25 T~. Ed. 554; Lo·l;al v .. Wolf~ 179 Ala. 505, 60 So. 298; 
OklaJtotna .lf oline Plow Co. v. Sntith, 41 Okla. 498~ 139 P. 
285; Idaho Implement Co. v. La .. ·mbach., 16 Ida. 497, 101 
P. 951~ 
The ,,.. alentines bolUld themselYes to build a ser,-icc 
station .SOine tlillC ill the future after April 10, 1~1)2+ rrhe 
payment of rental did not commence until 1\.ugust 10~ 
1952, or~' as soon thereafter as a service station is erected 
and accepted'' by the Jessee .. 
'.: ~\ li t•.\.ecntory contrart 1s nne in \\·hif•h a party 
hinds him~(\lf to do~ (Jl~ not to do a particular thing, 
\,-ll~·rPH~ an exp~·uted rout rnct i~ one iu \vhieh the 
o hject of an agreement i ~ performPd and every-
thing that "·ns to he ( l0ne, is don£:~~' 
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J ~ ;\m .. Jur.; Contract.~, para. 10. 
rfhe order of OCC-upancy was made prior to the com~ 
pletion of the station and the intervenor, not having taken 
possession of the property, could not force completion of 
the station. 
PoiNT V. 
THERE ARE NO DAMAGES RECOVERABLE BY 
THE INTERVENOR, FOR THE REASON THAT AT THE 
Tlrv!E OF ENTERING INTO THE ALLEGED LEASE 
UPON WHICH THEY SUE, THE INTERVENOR KNEW 
THi-\ T THE PROPERTY WAS ABOUT TO BE CON-
DEMNED AND THAT ANY INTEREST IT TOOK 
WAS A DEFEASIBLE INTEREST SUBJECT TO 
DEFEASANCE. 
DefeaRanee, as defined in Restatement, Property, 
para. 15·7 -0: 16b, is as follo,vs: 
"1~he 'vord 'defPaRancc' is used in this state~ 
ment generall~y to de~erihe not only the ending of 
an interest in aceorllanee \Vi tll i 1 s i ermr-;, as for 
example, by the expiration of ;~ stipulated dura-
tion or in accordance vrith the terms of a special 
limitation, but also the cutting short or an interest, 
:18 for example, tl1c c.ntting of an interest by a 
pOv{er of termination h y an executory 1 i mi ta tion~" 
If the intervenor had any property right at all, after 
its possession of the property, it '\vas at most a tenancy 
at will or at least a tenancy at sufferance. If it 'vas the 
lat.t.er, it is not. a tenancy at all; it is merely an arlverE;e 
possession.. H .. L. Rrcsf Co. v. IJru-ry (D(~) 6:! App. D .. C. 
329~ 68 Fed. ~d 167; H clh:r v., J cnfzr:h, 309 \J o .. 440, 260 
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S.,V. 979. If it is a tenancy at will, it is not transferrable 
(hence not salable) for the reason that tho purchaser has 
no right v..""hich he ho Ids against the landlord. rrhom pson, 
Real property, para. 1029. 
PoiNT VI4 
AT THE DATE OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS, 
THE INTERVENOR HAD NO OPERATIONAL EXPE-
RIENCE AND COULD NOT EVALUATE THE LEASE-
HOLD. 
The evaluation of any interest in the property owner 
as against the condemnor is as of the date of the service 
of summons in the condemnation action4 (This not to the 
eontrary under the decisions of t hP former la '\\'".) 
It was during the period from August 12,. 1952, until 
December of 1955, and only during that period, and under 
order of thu court, that th~ intervenor produced any 
business vthatsoever. So it becomes evident that there 
was no possible evaluation of the lea.sehold interest at the 
time the State actually took possession of the property. 
Chicago, etc4 v. Cath-olic Bish.op,.lO Xr E. 372. Mr. Kiepe 
testified at the hearing (Tr4, March 11, 1959, p. 10) that 
at the time he inspected the property, there ,\~as no Yalue 
to the leasehold. As to a later date, Mr. Kiepe testified, 
hased upon assumptions and potential values, that the 
leasehold had some value. He particularly qualified his 
remarks 'vith respect to the assumptions gubmitted tn him. 
There is no substantial basis for the assumption~ or the 
hypothetical questions submitted to Mr. Kiepe at the 
time he testified on ~larch 11~ 1959. See Orgel on \Tulua-
tion~ \Tol. 1, para. 162, et seq~ 
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PotxT VII~ 
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BE-
FORE THE TRIAL COURT TO ASSESS DAMAGES TO 
THE INTERVENOR. 
The only competent testimony submitted to the court 
which \Ve consider non-speculative nor remote [s that of 
l\Ir. Kiepe, who testified in substance that there v.,Tas no 
value to the lease for a buyer knowing that the State 
Road Commission was about to develop a. road through 
the premiRes of defendants Valentine and that even as 
late as 1955, when the Western States Refining Com-
pany vacated the premises, there would still be no value 
to the remainder of the lease~ (Tr. Trans. )farch 11~ 1959,. 
p. 10-29) 
The testimony of I\Ir. \'l agsta:ff and his assistants, 
as submitted to the court on the hearing of February 4, 
19597 was purely speculative and remote~ and we "\\'on~ 
der how speculative one can get in arriving at a proper 
measure of damages. The other testimony \Vhich ,~{as 
adduced in 1UilG was not sub~taTltiated hy any records, 
nor was there any competent testimony to indicate the 
value of the leasehold. (Tr. Trans.~ Nov. 7, 1956, P~ 35-46) 
Elements of this remote, speculative and conjectural 
damage are tarred \\'ith that ]abel and are not subjeet. 
to compensation as being a too distant extension or dam-
age~ based on consideration of the highest and best value 
of the land. 
The court in the case of I-luJniltou v. Pitls7rurgh B~ d~ 
L. ET~ R. Co .. , 190 Pa. 31, -J-~ ..:\t. 369, aptly stated it~ posi-
t ion on business profit.~ as evidence of YH lt H~ as f ollo\Y ~ : 
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(,; rl,hc \"Pl'Y most i.ha t ran 1 H.~ said in i t.s favor is, 
that sueh profits might possillly he made, hut that 
they \VOuld be made d<..~p011ds on so n1any contin. 
gennie~ that a verdict \vhieh purports to be the 
trutb cannot be based upon them. ~ ~ ~ Assume 
that today his fuel would (·ost no more for a large 
additional output, ho\v can he undertake to fix for 
years the cost of labor and n1alerials for operating 
his plant ? lio \\ .. c~;~ Tl he duterrnine that in the futu rc 
rival manufactureT~s 'vill not have advantages in 
some olller location superior to his and undersell 
hin1 on t}HJ market Y H ov,r can he determine thai 
l1is present supply of natural gas ~ill continue 
and that it vrill not give out? ~ • ~ T·he testimony 
on this subject waR vrildly speculative. • ~ ~" 
In the instant ease, we add one further speculation. 
Hovr can the intervenor determine ·~vhether gas "VI-Tars and 
und ereu tting \\rill not give 1\'"ay to the more conservati v(~ 
metl1od~ of dolng busines8 1 See Orgel, \ 1 ol. 1, p. 658-662. 
Ordinary profits are not to be considered. City of J_Jos 
A·ngelPs v. Deaco·n (1932}, 7 P~ 2d 378; Korf v. Fltming 
(1948L 3~ ~T. ,V. 2d 85; Ja.J1u·:.~· Pvuttry Co~ Y .. J..!eb-raska 
(! 1~fy ( 1939)' 284 1<. "'!· 273 .. 
CO~TCL(TSI():\ 
\Ve snbmit that the cause should be remanded to the 
(·ourt below '\\ith orders to dismiss the same. 
Respectfully submitted, 
\V.i\L'l,ER L~ BlJDGE 
_i \ tt o rn0 :.- G en er al 
\VALL~\C~11: B. KEL·L·r 
Assistant ~ \ ttorney General 
A ttor u ep~c..· for ~~ pp ell aj1 f 
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